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In 2009, the Mexican Congress received a proposal of a generalized 2% increase in the 
statutory VAT rate, including currently untaxed food and medicine. Whereas opponents 
emphasized the regressive effect, supporters argued that progressivity of the compensatory 
expenditures included in the bill more than compensated the bottom income quintiles. In 
this paper I present a tax-benefit incidence of this proposal using national survey data on 
household’s income and consumption. Despite the regressive effect of the tax increase, the 
data shows that the progressive expenditure offsets this effect. Overall the proposal was 
progressive. This finding undermines the arguments in favor of keeping food and 
medicines exempt of VAT to prevent a regressive effects. This result also contributes to 
the debate about the regressive effects of a single VAT to all consumption and no 
exemptions. To illustrate that, I analyze the redistributive effect of this policy. The result is 
that the increase in public expenditure can offset the regressive effect of this policy. 
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INTRODUCTION       
Latin America is the most unequal region in the world with an average Gini coefficient of 0.51— 
well above the world average of 0.41. This has led Latin American governments to pursue income 
redistribution as one of the main goals of tax and expenditure policy.
1 Mexico is not the exception 
to this rule, with a Gini coefficient of 0.48,
 2  the Mexican federal government has been struggling 
to reduce income inequality with a broad social expenditure agenda.  
Despite  substantial  progress  to  reduce  income  inequality  a  considerable  income  gap 
between rich and poor households still persists.
3  The top decile earns 37.62% of total pre-tax 
income whereas the bottom percentile only 1.22% (Table A.1, column A). Congress has been 
interested in the contribution of taxes and expenditure to narrow down this gap to the point that 
every year requires the Minister of Finance a report on this matter.
4  
For that reason, equity is one of the main criteria in the evaluation of any tax reform. 
Despite the importance of this normative principle, no serious analysis has been carried out upon 
its  approval  in  the  Mexican  congress.  Instead,  tax  reform  proposals  have  been  labeled  as 
progressive or regressive base on a first appearance and its approval. On example of this is the 
2009 tax reform proposal, referred as Poverty Tax Act (Iniciativa de Ley de la Contribucion para el 
Combate de la Pobreza). The proposal consisted in removing the current Value Added Tax (VAT) 
zero-rating on food and medicines with a 2% tax in order to expand a broad social expenditure 
agenda.  The federal government goals were to increase the federal government revenue and to 
increase  the  progressivity  of  the  combined  effect  of  fiscal  and  expenditure  policy.  Congress 
rejected it considering the regressive effect of taxation without considering the progressive effect 
of the social spending expansion.   
Despite the proposal represented a substantial fraction of resources (0.6% of GDP), no 
study  has  analyzed  the  redistributive  effect  on  income  distribution.  In  this  paper  I  provide 
preliminary  evidence  of  the  reform’s  redistribution  impact  based  on  national  survey  data  on 
                                                           
1 For instance,  Garcia and Salvato (2005) for Venezuela, Gasparin (1999) for Argentina and  Haughton (1999) in the 
case of Peru. In all these papers the finding is that government intervention is progressive 
2 ENIGH (2008). Gini coefficient of the reconstructed pre-tax income. See footnote 1 in Table 1.  
3 It is remarkable the effort made by social programs like Progresa -Oportunidades. According to Corbacho and 
Schwarts (2000) the Gini coefficient in Mexico in 1992 was 0.57. 
4 The report  prepared by the Minister of Finance every year is Distribución del pago de impuestos y recepción del 
gasto publico por deciles de hogares y personas. From here on I refer this as Minister of Finance (2010). PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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household income and consumption from Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares 
(ENIGH).  The estimation is mainly focused on the final effect on the imputed income net of taxes 
and expenditure.  The main result of my paper is that the proposal was indeed progressive: the 
regressivity of the 2% VAT on food and medicines is compensated by the expenditure package 
proposed:  mainly  a  increase  in  education  and  the  expansion  of  social  programs  like 
Oportunidades, a program that assists 25 million of low-income people  with conditional cash-
transfers to promote school attendance and medical checkups. 
The contribution of this paper is that it is the first tax-benefit analysis of this proposal. This 
is importance considering that the tax on food and medicines is one of the alternatives in the 
current tax reform debate. The main lesson is that the regressive tax increase on food can be 
offset by progressive expenditure expansion. This result gives political leverage as most of the 
opponents  based  their  argument  on  the  lack  of  compensatory  mechanisms  to  mitigate  the 
regressive effects. Likewise, this paper gives insights about future development in Mexican tax 
policy debate of broaden the VAT base removing all the current exemptions.  
In the first section, I show in detail the 2009 proposal: the tax increased and expenditure 
expansion proposed.  In the second section, I describe the methodology, definitions and the data 
used in the tax benefit incidence analysis. In the third section, I present the results of the analysis 
starting with the tax incidence of the VAT on food and medicines and then I proceed to analyze 
the  expenditure  (benefit)  incidence  of  the  proposed  compensatory  expenditure.    In  the  fourth 
section, I set the guideline of a more extensive reform pursing the tax rate harmonization and 
finally and in the last section I show my main conclusions. 
 
1. The Value Added Tax and the 2009 Presidential Reform. 
Since the nineties, the Mexican federal government has not generated enough tax revenue to 
cover the expenditure programs. On one hand, the government largely relies on oil revenue from 
the  state-owned  company  Petroleos  Mexicanos  (PEMEX).  This  source  of  revenue  has  been 
declining due to the exhaustion of Cantarell, the main offshore oil field in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Indeed since 2000, national oil production has been falling to the point that in 2010 it was 14 
percent  below  the  2000  levels:  half  a  million  barrels  less.
5    On  the  other  hand,  the  federal 
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government non-oil tax revenue increase has not been enough to compensate this shortfall. The 
problem  is  that  exemptions  and  loopholes  that  drastically  reduce  the  potential  income  and 
consumption  tax  revenue.  For  instance,  the  Value  Added  Tax  (VAT)  revenue  (3.7  percent  of 
GDP),  is  below  countries  with  lower  GDP  per  capita,  e.g.  Bolivia  (5.6)  or  Colombia  (6.3)  or 
Ecuador (6.4).
 6   
The low VAT revenue is due to the differentiated VAT rates leave out a significant share of 
consumption untaxed. In 2009, there were three VAT rates: a 15% rate for general consumption, 
a reduced border VAT 10% 
7and zero rates for food and medicine. Additionally, other goods like 
transportation, medical services, books, magazines and rent payments, etc. were exempted of the 
VAT
8.  The zero-rating on food accounts for most of tax revenue forgone due to exemptions as it 
represents a fiscal expenditure of 10 billions USD (1.1 percent of GDP).
9  
For that reason, one of the strategies to increase the non-oil tax revenue has been to 
increase the VAT on food and medicines pursuing a harmonization of the VAT to a single rate 
with no exemptions. The 2009 proposal was a first step towards this direction as it increased 2% 
the VAT rate on all consumption. This implied an increase of the statutory VAT rate from 15% to 
17% for most of the goods and a 2% VAT on food and medicine.
10  
The  proposal  faced  strong  opposition  in  Congress  based  on  concerns  about  the 
regressive  effect  on  the  poorest  households.  People  at  the  bottom  of  the  income  distribution 
spend 44.3% of their income on food and medicine whereas those at the top spend 15.7%.
11 The 
main fear was that an increase of the VAT on these products would result in poor households 
bearing  the  largest  tax  burden  increase.  The  proposal  was  controversial  to  the  point  that 
Congress only authorized an increase of 1% in the statutory rate but keeping food and medicine 
untaxed at the current zero VAT rate.
12   
                                                           
6 Barreix (2007). 
7 REPECOS Regimen de Pequeños Contribuyentes and a reduced VAT rate (10%) in the Border Strip with the USA  and 
Guatemala.  
8 The main difference between zero vat and exempt good is it classification in the law. In terms of its budgetary 
impact, both categories represent fiscal expenditure.   
9 http://www.shcp.gob.mx/INGRESOS/Ingresos_pres_gasto/presupuesto_gasto_fiscales_2010.pdf  
10  Presidencia de la Republica (2009). 
11 ENIGH (2008). 
12 In 2010,  the VAT increased to 16% for the previously 15% VAT  and to 11% in the border strip with the USA  and 
Guatemala. PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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Millions 
Concept pesos %
Total 71,775        100%
I EDUCATION 24,492        34%
Scholarships Oportunidades 19,711       27%
Oportunidades Componente Educativo 18,921        26%
Programa Albergues Escolares Indigenas 789            1%
Investment in Public Schools 4,781         7%
Consejo Nacional Fomento Educativo 4,571         6%
Programa Infraestructura Basica atencion Pueblos Indigenas 210            0%
II HEALTH 19,476        27%
Seguro Popular 18,412        26%
Programa Comunidades Saludables 115            0%
Programa Caravanas de Salud 761            1%
Sistema Integral Calidad Salud 188            0%
III CASH- IN KIND TRANSFERS 27,807        39%
Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades 20,043        28%
Programa Apoyo Alimentario 4,834         7%
Programa de Empleo Temporal 2,930         4%
Source: Presidencia de la Republica (2009).
Despite  the  regressive  effect  of  taxation,  the  federal  government  argued  that  the  final 
effect on households’ disposable income was progressive due to an expansion of progressive 
taxation that would compensate low-income households. The federal government estimated that 
the reform would generate 71 billions pesos (USD 5 billion or 0.6% of GDP) that were going to 
fund social expenditure to mitigate the regressive effects of the tax increase. The expenditure 
announced, shown in detail in Table 1, was distributed among:  cash-in kind transfer programs 
under  the    Programa  de  Apoyo  Alimentario  and  Desarrollo  Humano  Oportunidades  (39%), 
Education: Scholarships through Oportunidades and Public School programs (34%) and Health: 
an extension of the Seguro Popular and other programs (27%) a health program focused on  low 
income people.  








Whereas opponents of the proposals based their conclusions on the regressive effects of 
taxation, supporters did the same based on the progressivity of the expenditure.  No study has 
considered the combined effect of this proposal. In the next section, I introduce the methodology 
employed and the data that will be used the tax-benefit incidence to determined the reform’s final 
effect on household’s income. 
 
2. Tax-Benefit Incidence Analysis: Methodology and Data 
The  tax  benefit  incidence  analysis  assesses  government’s  budgetary  effect  (taxes  and  public 
spending) on the effective distribution of benefits and burdens associated with fiscal policy.  The PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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goal is to answers questions like: Who bears the burden of taxation? Who benefits from public 
expenditure? How the combined effect of the expenditure benefit and the tax burden affects the 
income  distribution?  As  starting  point,  the  effect  of  government  taxes  and  expenditure  on 
households’ income decile i can be represented by 
pre tax after tax imputed disposable
i i i i i y y y τ ε




−     is the pre-tax income    
i τ             is the tax paid 
after tax
i y
−    is the after-tax income 
imputed
i ε    is the imputed expenditure benefit 
disposable
i y   is the final imputed disposable income net of taxes and expenditure 
 
The budgetary impact is the resulting difference between the pre-tax income distribution 
and the imputed disposable income net of taxes and expenditure that is households’ available 
resources for consumption. Ideally, the budgetary impact should consider not only the change in 
allocation, changes in taxes and expenditure paid by each household, but also how households 
react towards this change.  Ideally, the pre-tax income distribution is such that would have taken 
place in the absence of taxes and expenditure as  well as the behavioral responses to them. 
Nevertheless, this distribution is unobservable and its estimation requires a general equilibrium, 
an analysis beyond the scope of this paper given data restrictions and the complexity of these 
behavioral responses. In this paper I used a reconstructed pre-tax given that the survey data 
reports the after-tax income. 
13 
In  this  paper,  a  tax  benefit  analysis  focuses  on  the  allocation  change  leaving  the 
behavioral response as a separate problem.  As Poterba (2007) mentions, in any tax change 
there are two effects in the income distribution that should be considered. The first one is the 
redistributive impact of taxes themselves given a pre-tax income distribution, this effect is the one 
presented  in  this  paper.  The  second  effect  is from  changes  in  the  pre-tax  distribution  due  to 
                                                           
13 The adjustment was done with the following procedure. First, I adjusted households aggregate demand reported 
in  the  System  of  National  Accounts  to  the  total  autonomous  income  reported  in  the  survey  data.
13  Second,  I 
subtracted the imputed taxes paid and expenditure received by income decile using the federal government balance 
sheet and the tax burden and benefit received reported distribution reported by the Minister of Finance.  PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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behavioral responses. This is not captured by static analysis and its implications are not trivial. 
However, the inclusions of these effects require information that is not available in almost any 
country.  The  incorporation  of  the  behavioral  response  requires  the  construction  of  theoretical 
models that goes beyond the scope of the tax benefit incidence analysis. 
 Instead, the tax benefit incidence analysis is based on simplifying assumptions that allow 
the  quantification  of  the  redistributive  impact  of  taxation  and  expenditure.  The  computation  is 
focused on the regressivity of the tax increase vs. the progressivity of the expenditure. In other 
words,  how  the  VAT  tax  on  food  and  medicines  and  the  expenditure  increase  modify  the 
economic incidence of government on income distribution. 
The departing point of this analysis is the pre-reform scenario, in the absence of VAT  on 
food and medicines. Regarding federal taxes, the first section of Table A.1 in the appendix shows 
that the tax burden distribution, defined as tax payments as a fraction of income, is progressive as 
the tax burden increases with income (column C). The progressivity of the tax system leads to a 
reduction of the Gini coefficient from 0.482  of the pre-tax income distribution to 0.475 of the after 
tax income. Nonetheless, the second section of this table shows that the main redistribution is 
made  through  government  expenditure  as  the  bottom  deciles  receive  the  largest  fraction  of 
expenditure (column E). These expenditure transfers have a significant impact on income at the 
bottom  of  the  distribution  as  in  some  cases  they  represent  more  than  100%  of  the  after  tax 
income (column F).  The progressivity of the expenditure translates into a substantial reduction in 
potential  consumption  inequality,  as  the  Gini  coefficient  of  imputed  income  net  of  taxes  and 
expenditure  drops to 0.421 (column G). 
  The income distribution in Table A.1 is the benchmark to assess the impact of the reform.  
The  first  step  of  the  analysis  is  the  estimation  of  the  tax  incidence  of  the  VAT  on  food  and 
medicines 
VAT
i τ ∆ on the tax burden distribution and the change in the after-tax income distribution.  
( ) ( )
Post reform pre tax VAT after tax
i i i i y y τ τ
− − − − +∆ =  (2) 
The second step is to analyze the effect that the expenditure increase 
increase
i ε ∆ , using the 
proceeds of taxation, has on the expenditure distribution.  
( ) ( ) ( )
Post reform Post reform after tax imputed increase disposable
i i i i y y ε ε
− − − + +∆ =   (3) PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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  As an illustrative example, I also show the marginal effect of the reform isolating it from the 
rest of taxes. That is for every peso taxed and spent through this reform what fraction is paid and 
received  by  each  income  decile.  Given  that  a  conventional  tax  incidence  analysis  does  not 
consider behavioral responses to the VAT on food does not the incidence of the other taxes 
remains constant as the as household’s consumption. Under these assumptions, the change in 
disposable  income  is  the  resulting  net  transfer  between  the  additional  spending  minus  the 
increase of the VAT burden defined as:   
( )
disposable increase VAT
i i i y ε τ ∆ = ∆ −∆   (4) 
2.1 Tax incidence methodology 
The first step is to assess the distribution of the tax payments  i τ  Although the law is explicit about 
who has to pay the taxes, statutory incidence, generally who ultimately bears the tax burden is 
different,  economic  incidence.  Tax  incidence  analysis  has  been  an  important  area  in  Public 
Finance since the seminal works of Musgrave et al. (1951) and Pechman and Okner (1974).
14 
The  existing  literature  has  used  conventional  assumptions  to facilitate the  computation  of the 
burden and it distribution. In this paper I will follow the conventional assumptions listed by Anwar 
and Whalley (1991) in studies for developing countries. 
The  starting  point  is  the  estimation  of  the  tax  burden.  Taxes  usually  impose  excess 
burdens on consumers: deadweight loss.  On the efficiency ground the size of the burden is 
relevant to analyze the welfare loss due to the tax, however given that tax incidence analysis is 
focused on the equity impact of the tax (tax incidence)  and not the efficiency impact (excess 
burden  losses),  a  conventional  assumption  is  that  the total  tax  burden  coincides  with  the  tax 
revenue collected (tax burden assumption).  
Similarly, I am assuming that the entire tax burden is shifted from producers to consumers 
(shifting assumption). I assume that households pay the statutory rate of 15% on the taxable 
consumption and no tax on the exempted VAT goods.
15 Although some authors like Stern (1987), 
have  pointed  out  that  estimation  of  the  tax  burden  requires  an  estimation  of  the  distribution 
between consumer and producer based on the elasticities of supply and demand, the information 
                                                           
14  See Nssah (2008) and Martinez Vasquez (2001) for a literature review. 
15 Some authors have assumed that households pay a fraction of VAT incorporated in the production of food or 
medicine. For instance,  Vargaz Telles (2009) assumes that households pay half of the statutory tax rate.  PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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provided by survey on households consumption  is not enough for such calculations as the survey 
only  gives  the  amount  of  money  spent  without  separate  prices  and  quantities.
  16  As  in  the 
standard  tax  incidence  analysis,  the  tax  burden  and  the  shifting  assumptions  allow  the 
computation without any explicit estimation of the estimation of elasticities of demand or supply.  
The second step in the tax incidence analysis is to allocate the tax burden among different 
income deciles. I use national consumption data from Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de 
los Hogares (ENIGH 2008). The survey covers 35,000 households with consumption information 
representative  at  the  national  level.  For  analytical  purposes  I  use  households’  monetary 
consumption with adjusted prices to estimate the tax burdens.
17  Using the categories listed in 
Table A.2 in the appendix I grouped monetary consumption by VAT category. A summary of this 
information is shown in Table A.3. The first row of this table shows that 49% of all consumption is 
taxed at the general rate whereas the rest is either exempted or zero-rated. This is the main 
reason why the VAT base is so small. Just food consumption represents 24% of all monetary 
consumption whereas medicine 1%. 
  Table A.3 also shows the distribution of monetary expenditure by income decile. In the 
case  of  goods  taxed  at  the  general  rate  and  exempted  goods  (like  transportation,  education 
services, rent and medical services) the top deciles spend a larger fraction of their consumption 
than households at the bottom of the distribution (columns A and B). In contrast, the opposite 
trend is observed in the case of the zero-rated  food and medicines. In this case: the poorer the 
household the bigger the share of total consumption spent on these goods (column C). In the 
case of food, difference is remarkable as the share allocated by households at the bottom of the 
distribution is three times the share allocated by households at the top (column C1). As I will show 
in the following section, this consumption structure implies the progressive distribution observed in 
the VAT  burden distribution.  
I use the consumption distribution to adjust the aggregate consumption data reported in 
the System of National Accounts and the aggregate tax revenue. This is important to capture how 
                                                           
16 If q is the consumer price and the consumer is given p=(q-t), the effect of the tax on consumer prices will be given 
by η/(η+ εp/q) where η and ε are respectively the elasticities of supply and demand.  
17 The survey provides consumption at market value (VAT is included in the price). Therefore it is necessary to 
estimate the VAT paid adjusting consumption first. Following Vargaz Telles (2009),  the VAT paid by the  family i for 
the jth good is  Tij=tjbjdij, where tj is the VAT rate,  bj is the price given by the producer and dij  the units demanded. 
Given that the total expenditure reported in the survey gij  is defined by gij=bjdij + Tij  thus bjdij = gij-Tij which combined 
with the definition of  Tij, yields  Tij=tj(gij-Tij) and rewriting Tij=[tj/(1+tj)]gij. PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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the  change  in  the  VAT  distribution  affects  the  overall  progressivity  of  the  federal  taxes.  As 
mentioned earlier, in the analysis of the reform I am not considering any change in the rest of the 
taxes. For that reason I use the estimation of the Minister of Finance (SHCP) for the computation 
of the tax burden distribution of the rest of federal taxes: income tax, social security payroll tax, 




2.2 Benefit incidence methodology 
A central issue in this paper is if the expenditure progressivity included in the reform proposal can 
compensate the regressive effect o taxation. Evidently this depends on the public expenditure 
effect on households after tax income. However, given its heterogeneous nature of government 
spending,  requires  valuation  assumptions  that  allow  the  calculation.  In  principle,  this  is  a 
challenge as how can we assess the effect of a new school or the improvement of health due 
vaccination campaigns on households’ income? Whereas it is easier to measure cash transfers, it 
is  more  difficult  to  measure  the  benefit  accruing  from  public  and  private  goods  provided  by 
government: e.g. expenditure on health, education, etc. Usually we do not have market prices or 
information  about  the  value  of  such  services.  Even  if  we  had  markets  for  certain  goods,  as 
Martinez Vazquez (2008) suggest, given that their supply is monopolized by the State, the price 
would not reflect the marginal benefit to consumers. For these reasons, the standard assumption 
in the literature, and followed in this paper, is that the benefit of the public expenditure is given by 
the cost of provision paid by government. 
Following Nssah (2008), Sehili et. al (2008) and Demery (2003), imputing the distribution 
of value of government transfers by the cost of provision  requires two steps. The first one is to 
assess the cost of the public service using the government aggregate data. The second step is to 
estimate the rate of use of each service by household decile from households’ survey data and 
then  derive  the  distribution  of  such  imputed  value.    The  estimation  of  the  incidence  of  the 
expenditure  included  in  the  2009  reform  proposal,  shown  in  Table  1,  follows  this  procedure 
utilizing the methodology published by the Minister of Finance (SHCP).  
                                                           
18 Minister of Finance (2010). PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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VAT rate: 15%   VAT rate: 17% (incl.  2% on food and medicines)  
VAT burden    
Pre Tax  as fraction VAT burden VAT burden as a fraction of Pre- Tax Income   VAT
Income  Income  Distribution of Pre Tax Distribution Total General  Medicaments   payment
decile Distribution Income (%) VAT Rate Food and others increase (%)
A B C D E=E1+E2+E3 E1 E2 E3   F
 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00  
1 1.22 2.28 9.90 2.49 12.48 10.68 1.72 0.08 32.40
2 2.55 3.33 6.93 3.56 8.56 7.48 1.03 0.06 29.77
3 3.58 4.27 6.30 4.49 7.67 6.80 0.81 0.05 27.75
4 4.65 5.35 6.09 5.56 7.33 6.58 0.70 0.04 26.25
5 5.76 6.35 5.84 6.56 6.97 6.30 0.63 0.04 25.38
6 7.13 7.84 5.82 8.01 6.88 6.28 0.56 0.04 24.06
7 9.12 9.25 5.37 9.36 6.28 5.79 0.46 0.03 22.96
8 11.77 11.71 5.26 11.70 6.09 5.68 0.37 0.03 21.38
9 16.61 17.03 5.43 16.77 6.18 5.86 0.30 0.03 19.65
10 37.62 32.59 4.58 31.50 5.13 4.95 0.15 0.03 17.45
Source: ENIGH (2008) .
In  the  case  of  the  investment  on  Public  Schools,  I  took  the  average  cost  per  student 
estimated  by  the  Minister  of  Education,  Household  benefit  is  determined  by  the  number  of 
children  in  schooling  age  reported  in  the  ENIGH  (2008).    In  the  case  of  Scholarships 
Oportunidades, I used transfers information included in ENIGH (2008) and Minister of Finance 
(2008). In the case of the expenditure on Health I use the rate of use of the three main health 
institutions in Mexico: Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS), Instituto de Seguridad Social 
y Servicios de los Trabajadores del Estado  (ISSSTE) and Pemex reported in Minister of Finance 
(2010). Finally, the cash and in-kind transfers I use the distribution of monetary transfers reported 
in the income section of ENIGH (2008). 
 
3. Tax-Benefit Incidence Analysis  
3.1 The redistribution effect of the VAT increase on zero VAT goods 
Based on the methodology shown in the previous section, Table 2 shows the pre and post reform 
VAT burden distribution by income decile. The first section of the table shows that the VAT is 
regressive, as the bottom 7 deciles bear a higher burden than their income share (column B), thus 
the  VAT    burden  as  a  fraction  of  pre  tax  income  (column  C)  is  around  half  for  wealthier 
households respect the ones at the bottom of the distribution.  
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Tax burden distribution (%)   Total After tax income distribution (%) Change in income
Income  Pre After  Tax Pre After  (% of Pre reform
decile Reform Reform Increase Reform Reform Pre-Tax Income)
A B B-A C D E E-D F
Gini
coefficient 0.475 0.476
1 1.09 1.34 0.25 35.33 1.23 1.21 -0.02 -2.77
2 1.53 1.85 0.32 33.41 2.64 2.62 -0.02 -1.71
3 2.35 2.67 0.33 25.50 3.69 3.67 -0.02 -1.44
4 3.38 3.70 0.32 20.75 4.76 4.74 -0.02 -1.30
5 4.34 4.66 0.32 18.39 5.88 5.86 -0.02 -1.20
6 5.94 6.23 0.28 15.49 7.23 7.22 -0.02 -1.13
7 8.15 8.32 0.17 12.55 9.21 9.20 -0.01 -0.98
8 11.14 11.18 0.04 10.59 11.83 11.83 0.00 -0.88
9 17.82 17.56 -0.26 8.61 16.50 16.52 0.01 -0.82
10 44.33 42.48 -1.85 5.62 37.02 37.14 0.11 -0.60
Source: ENIGH (2008).
The rest of Table 2 shows that the generalized increase of the 2% to a 17% general rate 
and 2% VAT on food and medicines exacerbate the VAT regressivity. Comparing the VAT burden 
before and after the reform we observe that the share paid by the bottom 7 deciles increases 
(columns D and B). Regarding the VAT burden as a fraction of pre-tax income, we observe that 
the 2% increase of zero VAT products is mainly borne by low income households as their tax 
burden increase is larger than households at the top of the income distribution (columns E and C). 
In particular, the VAT on food is the most regressive  (column E2) as the fraction of the pre tax 
income paid by the bottom decile represents more than ten times the fraction paid by the top 
decile (1.72% vs 0.15%). Although with smaller differences, the VAT on medicine and other zero 
VAT products are also regressive. This regressivity is translated into a disproportional increase of 
low  income  households  VAT  liabilities  (column  F):  30%  for  the  lower  part  of  the  income 
distribution and 20% for the upper part.  
Evidently  this  regressive  effect  raises  concerns  about  how  the  reform  modifies  the 
progressivity of the tax system. To illustrate this, Table 3 shows the  VAT payments combined 
with other excise and income taxes.
19   







Columns A and B show that the reform reduces the tax burden of the top 2 deciles, in 
particular for the top decile. This comes from the disproportional tax increase across the income 
distribution (column C). The bottom decile increases its tax liability seven times more than the top 
decile:  35.33%  versus  5.62%  resulting  into  a  larger  loss  of  after-tax  income  for  first  groups 
                                                           
19 That is the personal income tax (ISR) and the excise taxes on tobacco, gasoline and other goods: IEPS (Impuesto 
Especial sobre la Produccion de bienes y Servicios), automobile taxes (Tenencia) and brand new car tax (ISAN). PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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EDUCATION HEALTH CASH-IN KIND 
Income  Scholarship Investment in (Seguro TRANSFERS TOTAL
decile Oportunidades 1/ Public Schools 2/  Popular) 3/ (Oportunidades ) 1/ Distribution
A B C D E
1 34.03 18.42 19.85 33.33 28.87
2 18.32 15.66 16.03 18.42 17.56
3 12.57 13.42 11.96 12.72 12.52
4 9.42 11.03 10.69 9.43 9.88
5 6.28 9.56 8.91 6.36 7.24
6 7.33 8.59 8.14 7.24 7.60
7 4.71 7.40 6.62 4.82 5.45
8 3.14 6.53 6.62 3.29 4.37
9 2.62 5.50 6.36 2.63 3.83
10 1.57 3.90 4.83 1.75 2.68
Source: ENIGH (2008), Minister of Finance (2010) and Minster of Education (SEP).
1/ Based on scholarships received from income reported in ENIGH (2008)
2/ I consider the average cost per pupil published by Minister of Education (SEP). I multiply this cost by the
attendance to public primary schools by income decile reported in ENIGH (2008). 
3/ Based on ENIGH (2008) I consider the number of beneficiaries of Seguro Popular by income decile.
(column F). Evidently this undermines the progressivity of the tax system shown in Table 1. As the 
Gini coefficient of the After-tax income slightly increases after the reform is implemented (columns 
D and E).These results are the main evidence for opponents to the proposal, as the exemption on 
food prevents a highly regressive VAT. In general, countries that do not have these exemptions 
tend to have a more regressive VAT.
20 The next question to answer is if the progressivity of the 
expenditure offets the regressive effect.  
 
3.2 Benefit incidence results 
As mentioned in the first section, the federal government proposed to use the proceeds of the tax 
increase  to  fund  the  social  programs  listed  in  Table  1.  The  benefit  incidence  of  each  of  the 
programs included in the presidential proposal is highly progressive as a substantial fraction of the 
expenditure is received by the first three deciles, in particular by the bottom decile. For instance, 
the  bottom  decile  receives  34%  and  33%  of  the  total  expenditure  on  the    Scholarship 
Oportunidades  and  Cash-Kind    transfers  programs.    Although  slightly  less  progressive,  the 
expenditure on health and the investment in public schools also concentrate a substantial fraction 
on  the  bottom  four  deciles.    Overall,  the  compensatory  effect  of  the  expenditure  proposal 
combining the programs listed (column E) mostly benefits the bottom three deciles. 








                                                           
20 For instance, Engel et al. (1999) show that in Chile, where food is not exempt the VAT is quite regressive. PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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Proposal's VAT Federal Govt Combined Expenditure
Income  Expenditure  Increase Net Expenditure Net 80% Proposal + Net
decile Distribution 1/ Distribution 2/ Transfer Distribution 3/ Transfer  20% States Expend. Transfer
A B A-B C C-B D=80% B + 20% C D-B
 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1 28.87 3.45 25.43 11.80 8.35 25.46 22.01
2 17.56 4.62 12.94 10.50 5.88 16.15 11.53
3 12.52 5.52 7.00 10.00 4.48 12.01 6.50
4 9.88 6.54 3.34 9.80 3.26 9.86 3.32
5 7.24 7.50 -0.26 9.40 1.90 7.67 0.17
6 7.60 8.78 -1.19 10.50 1.72 8.18 -0.61
7 5.45 9.89 -4.44 10.00 0.11 6.36 -3.53
8 4.37 11.65 -7.29 10.00 -1.65 5.49 -6.16
9 3.83 15.58 -11.75 8.90 -6.68 4.84 -10.74
10 2.68 26.47 -23.79 9.10 -17.37 3.97 -22.50
Source: ENIGH (2008) and  Minister of Finance 2010.
1/ Following the expenditure distribution of column E in Table 6.
2/ Given that this table only consider the tax and expenditure at the margin, I am only considering the distribution of the  tax burden  
increase. Note that this is different to the new VAT  burden distribution show in Table 3 where I consider not only the 2% increase.
3/ As published in Minister of Finance (2010). This distribution is estimated using the same metothology that I am using in column A.
3.3 Does the expenditure proposed compensate the regressive effect of this policy?  
The next question to answer is if the benefit incidence compensates the regressive effect of the 
tax increase. In order to show the change in disposable income, Table 5 shows the implicit net 
transfer per 100 pesos collected and spent by this reform, as defined in equation 4.  The marginal 
net transfer is computed considering the expenditure distribution (column A), distributed according 
to the distribution shown in Table 4, minus the distribution of the VAT burden increase (column B). 
The tax burden increase includes the 2% on food and medicaments plus the additional 2% in all 
the consumption taxed at the general rate.  









   The  resulting  net  transfers  are  shown  in  column  A-B.  The  first  decile  ends  up  with  a 
positive transfer of 25.43 pesos, as it receives 28.87 pesos through public expenditure and only 
pays 3.45 pesos of VAT. On the other side, the top decile ends up with a negative transfer of 
23.79 pesos (it just receives 2.68 pesos and pays 26.47 pesos). Considering the net transfers 
throughout the income distribution, the government proposal redistributes income from the upper 
half to the bottom half of the income distribution getting a quasi-symmetric structure of transfers: 
note that the positive net transfer of the bottom decile equals the negative net transfer of top 
deciles. Overall, the combined policy is progressive as the government offsets the regressive 
effect of the taxation with the expenditure proposal. PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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Table 5 also shows other possible scenarios once the reform was approved. One concern 
is  that  the  federal  government,  instead  of  expending  the  additional  revenue  in  the  programs 
included in the presidential proposal, simply expands the federal expenditure (column C).  In this 
case the resulting net transfer (column C-B) , the expenditure is less progressive the resulting net 
transfers redistribute income from the top three deciles to the rest of the distribution. Notice that in 
this  case the  redistribution from the  top  deciles  to  the  bottom  deciles  is  not  as  large  but  the 
redistribution is still progressive.  
Another  possibility  is  that  the  federal  government  cannot  fully  spend  the  additional 
revenue.  This  case  is  possible  because  given  the  fiscal  laws  20%  of  the  federal  non  oil  tax 
revenue is directly transferred from the Federal Government to the States, being the latter who 
decide how to use these funds. Therefore the compensatory expenditure would not mach the 
amount taxed through the VAT increase. The last two columns in Table 5 consider this case. 
Given the lack of information about the distribution of state governments’ expenditure, I assume 
that the 20% spent by the state governments has the same distribution as the federal expenditure 
shown in column C. The remaining 80% is assumed to be spent in the programs included in the 
proposal.  The resulting net payment (column D-B)  shows the same quasi-symmetric structure as 
in the previous case. The net payment by the top third of the distribution translates into net benefit 
to the bottom third. Thus, the data suggest that even if the federal government does cannot use 
all the funds in the expenditure proposal, the combined effect is progressive. 
 
3.4 How the reform affects federal fiscal policy income redistribution? 
The next question to answer is how the redistributive capacity of the government is modified by 
the reform? Based on equations 2 and 3, Table 6 shows the effect of this policy on imputed 
disposable income. On one side, as shown in Table 4, there is the regressive effect of the reform 
in  the  total  tax  burden distribution, the  VAT  combined  with  the  rest  of  the taxes.    For easier 
comparison, I repeat this change in Table 6 (column B-A). As mentioned previously, the reform 
reduces the tax burden distribution of the top two deciles and increases the burden of the rest of 
the distribution, in particular, from the second to the sixth decile. On the other side, Table 6 also 
shows the progressive effect of the additional expenditure of 71 billions in the programs included 
in the proposal (column D-C). After the reform, the bottom three deciles increase their share of 
total expenditure. PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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Taxes Burden  Government Expenditure Disposable Income Change in 
distribution (%) distribution (%) distribution (%) disposable
Income  Pre After  Difference Pre After  Difference Pre After  Difference income
decile Reform Reform (basis points) Reform Reform (basis points) Reform Reform (basis points) (% Pre reform level)
A B B-A C D D-C E F F-E G
Gini coefficient 0.421 0.416
1 1.09 1.34 0.25 11.80 12.76 0.96 2.34 2.51 0.17 7.42
2 1.53 1.85 0.32 10.50 11.00 0.50 3.46 3.56 0.10 2.93
3 2.35 2.67 0.33 10.00 10.22 0.22 4.35 4.41 0.06 1.34
4 3.38 3.70 0.32 9.80 9.78 -0.02 5.29 5.31 0.02 0.41
5 4.34 4.66 0.32 9.40 9.28 -0.12 6.25 6.25 0.00 -0.01
6 5.94 6.23 0.28 10.50 10.34 -0.16 7.58 7.57 -0.01 -0.08
7 8.15 8.32 0.17 10.00 9.74 -0.26 9.29 9.26 -0.03 -0.32
8 11.14 11.18 0.04 10.00 9.59 -0.41 11.64 11.58 -0.06 -0.51
9 17.82 17.56 -0.26 8.90 8.54 -0.36 15.71 15.62 -0.09 -0.57
10 44.33 42.48 -1.85 9.10 8.69 -0.41 34.10 33.93 -0.17 -0.50
Source: ENIGH (2008)







The  combined  effect  of  these  two  changes  on  imputed  household  disposable  income 
shows a symmetric redistribution from the top to the bottom of the income distribution (column F-
E). The first four deciles are the only deciles that increase their share of total income, in particular 
the first two deciles, whereas the main drop is observed for the top decile.  In order to consider 
the  magnitude  of  this  redistribution,  column  G,  shows  the  change  in  imputed  household’s 
resources as a percentage of the pre reform income. The bottom three deciles increase their 
resources: 7.42%, 2.93% and 1.34% respectively. The fifth and sixth deciles remain unchanged 
whereas the top three deciles have a decrease of roughly 0.5%.  From all these changes, the 
imputed resource improves as the Gini coefficient decreases from 0.421 to 0.416.  Thus, the tax 
benefit incidence analysis suggests that this policy is progressive. 
   
4. Should Mexico reduce the zero VAT rate to benefit the poor?  
From  the  previous  sections,  the  increase  of  government  expenditure  contributes  to  income 
redistribution to the point that if offsets the regressive effect of the tax increase. This gives some 
room for a reform towards a consumption-based system.  However, increasing the tax revenue 
faces several challenges. One of them is the low compliance due to the existing loopholes in the 
fiscal laws and the big informal sector. From an administrative perspective, indirect taxes like the 
VAT  seem  to  be  easier  to  collect  (in  contrast  with  the  income  tax  and  all  the  deductions). 
Likewise, given that income taxes do not target households in the informal sector, there is the 
perception  that  taxing  consumption  will  reach  these  households.  However,  is  it  not  clear  that 
compliance  will  increase  by  introducing  indirect  taxation  because,  as  in  the  income  tax,   PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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Tax Burden 1/  After Tax Income      Imputed Household's Resources 2/
Pre Tax % change   Change
Income  Income Distribution (%) Tax Distribution (%) of Distribution (%) as % of
decile Distribution Current Flat VAT Increase Current Flat VAT After-Tax   Current Flat VAT Current
(%) Tax % Tax Income   Tax Level
A B C C-B D E F F-E G H I I-H J
Gini  0.482 0.475 0.482 0.421 0.411
coefficient
1 1.22 1.09 2.11 1.02 22.96 1.23 1.11 -0.13 -13.45 2.40 2.64 0.24 9.90
2 2.55 1.53 2.69 1.16 14.91 2.64 2.53 -0.11 -7.56 3.55 3.71 0.16 4.61
3 3.58 2.35 3.46 1.11 12.76 3.69 3.60 -0.09 -6.04 4.47 4.59 0.13 2.81
4 4.65 3.38 4.36 0.99 11.75 4.76 4.68 -0.08 -5.14 5.42 5.52 0.10 1.82
5 5.76 4.34 5.34 1.00 10.94 5.88 5.81 -0.07 -4.78 6.41 6.46 0.05 0.81
6 7.13 5.94 6.71 0.76 10.41 7.23 7.18 -0.05 -4.27 7.77 7.84 0.06 0.81
7 9.12 8.15 8.43 0.29 9.22 9.21 9.21 0.00 -3.57 9.53 9.56 0.03 0.29
8 11.77 11.14 11.49 0.34 8.52 11.83 11.81 -0.02 -3.75 11.94 11.86 -0.08 -0.65
9 16.61 17.82 17.18 -0.64 8.18 16.50 16.54 0.03 -3.40 16.12 15.89 -0.22 -1.38
10 37.62 44.33 38.24 -6.09 6.27 37.02 37.53 0.51 -2.26 34.99 34.52 -0.47 -1.34
Source: ENIGH (2008).
1/ Includes the VAT and the rest of the federal taxes. In the case of the Flat Tax, it is assumed an statutory rate of 15% to all consumption without
zero VAT goods.
2/ Government net transfers are the proportional part of expenditure corresponding to that decile. In this case I am not assuming any change
in the federal expenditure distribution. This the expenditure is distributes as in Table 1.
taxpayers  underreport  their  transactions  in  order  to  avoid  the  VAT.  Despite  notable  progress 
made by the Federal Government during the last years the VAT avoidance is still an issue.
21   
Harmonizing  the  VAT  tax  rates  would  reduce  the  tax  expenditure,  that  is  the  revenue 
forgone  through  VAT  zero  rates  and  exemptions.  For  instance,  the  zero-rating  on  food  and 
medicine represents a fiscal expenditure of 1% of the GDP. Despite the potential increase in tax 
revenue that this measure represents, the question is about the redistributive effect of this reform. 
In order to answer this question, I simulate the hypothetical situation, where a harmonized Flat 
VAT rate on all consumption is imposed. In this case all consumption is taxed at 15%, including 
the zero VAT goods, and the rest of the income and excise taxes remain unchanged. Table 7 
shows the implied effect on the tax burden and expenditure distribution. On the taxation side, 
under the Flat Tax the progressivity of the tax system would be eliminated (columns B  and C). 
Notice that the two top deciles reduce their share of tax burden whereas the rest of the distribution 
increases it. This reallocation is the result of the disproportional tax increase at the bottom of the 
distribution (column D): whereas the tax liability of the bottom decile increases 23% the increase 
of the top decile is just 6.17%. As a consequence the bottom of the distribution experiences the 
largest fall of the after tax income (column G). The regressivity of this change is reflected by the 
increase of the Gini coefficient (columns E and F). The after-tax income distribution under the Flat 
Tax regime (column F) is the same than the Gini of the Pre Tax Income distribution (column A). 








                                                           
21 Fuentes Castro (2010) estimate a drop in the  VAT avoidance from 23.22% in 2000 to 19.79% in 2007. PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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For  determining  the  impact  on  households’  disposable  income  I  do  not  consider  any 
change in the expenditure distribution and I assume the same expenditure distribution shown 
previously. 
22 The change on household disposable income distribution (column I-H) shows  a 
progressive redistribution form the top three deciles to the rest of the distribution, in particular for 
the first three deciles. In terms of percentage change (column J) these deciles would have a 
percentage increase of the income of: 9.90%, 4.61% and 2.81% respectively whereas people at 
the two top deciles observe a drop larger than one percent. 
This  preliminary  result  suggests  that  eliminating  the  zero  VAT  rate  could  benefit  poor 
households more than harm them. Thus it could happen that zero rate on food and medicines 
although  prevents  the  regressive  effect  of  the  taxation,  it  implies  a  substantially  drop  in 
progressive expenditure.  After all, it could be possible that poor households would be better off 
paying the tax and getting back the additional expenditure. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper gives preliminary evidence that the generalize 2%  VAT seems to be progressive. The 
proposed progressive expenditure offsets the regressivity of eliminating the zero VAT rate on food 
and medicine.  The result is important as concerns about the regressivity of consumption taxes do 
not consider the effect of public expenditures on household’s disposable income. This paper gives 
a glimpse of this debate and suggests that consumption based taxation could be progressive. The 
extent  of  these  benefits  depends  on  the  compensatory  mechanisms  for  the  bottom  of  the 
distribution. In  order  to pick the  ideal  compensatory  mechanism, the  impact  of  schooling  and 
health  care  expenditures  and  tax  compliance  across  different  income  groups  should  be 
considered.  
  For future research, several things can be addressed. For instance the quantification of 
the benefits can be done without following the conventional assumption that the benefit of the 
public expenditure is given by its cost of provision.
23  The cost of provision does not necessarily 
represent the improvement in household’s welfare. This brings up the issue of the fungibility of 
                                                           
22 Table 5 (column C). 
23 As mentioned previously, assessing the impact of expenditures presents serious estimation issues, so studies like 
Martinez Vazquez (2008) Nssah (2008), Sehili et. al (2008) and Demery (2003), Minister of Finance (2010) and Vargas 
Tellez (2009) follow this assumption. PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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services provided by government: do household value a dollar spent on health programs or a new 
school  worth  the  same  as  cash  transfer?  This  question  is  essential  as  governments  use 
taxpayer’s money for the provision of public goods and services. For instance, in the expenditure 
proposal analyzed in this paper, 61% of the new taxes are allocated through education and health 
services and the rest to money transfers. Thus a correct assessing of the benefits is crucial to 
determine the compensation of the regressive effect of taxation. 
Similarly, the presence of the informal sector is important in a country like Mexico where 
people at the bottom of the distribution live in rural areas where tax collection is limited. Although 
the statutory tax rate implies taxing more these groups, it does not mean they will effectively pay 
more. Low tax compliance among these groups might be a factor in favor of indirect taxation: as 
low  income  people  in  the  informal  sector  do  not  pay  the  taxes  and  get  the  benefits  of  the 
expenditure increase. 
Another crucial issue is the static nature of the analysis as no behavioral response is 
assumed.  For  instance,  conventional  studies  assume  that  total  tax  burdens  coincide  with  the 
revenue collected by the government.  However, as Martinez Vazquez (2001) points out, the final 
effect in real income might be larger than the actual taxes collected, implying social welfare loses.  
This evidently depends on the behavioral response. Similarly, a static analysis implies that the 
change in tax burden is immediate. This overlooks the incorporation of transitional cost that might 
be relevant for comparing intergenerational welfare redistributions. 
The use of a Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) model seems to be the natural 
next  step  to  incorporate  the  behavioral  responses.  The  current  literature  (e.g.  Diamond  and 
Zodrow  (2005)  Auerbach  and  Kotlikoff  (1987)  and  Altig  et.  al.  (1997)  has  been  focused  in 
evaluating in other different dimensions. For instance, in efficiency ground, the model can test the 
suggested  efficiency  gains  suggested  by  Atkinson  and  Stiglitz  (1976)  that  give  no  room  to 
consumption  tax  rates  differentiation.    Similarly,  a  CGE  model  would  allow  estimating  the 
additional revenue as in the presence of the informal as the revenue gains can not be as large as 
they seem to be. The shift from the formal to the informal sector can reduce the revenue gains as 
shown by Ab Iorweth and Whalley (2002).Thus as we can see this debate has a long way to go 
not only in the political arena but also in the theoretical grounds. 
 PRELIMINARY DRAFT prepared for Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.   
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Non durable goods Services
Food Financial services related 
Medicines with pensions and mortgages
Books Insurance
Gold and currency Rental housing
Water (Utilities) Public transportation
Financial assets Raffle and loteries
School fees and tuitions
Durable Goods Interest and loans
Land purchases Public shows
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Source: Value Added Tax Act.
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Table A.1 The Effects of Taxes and Expenditures on the Mexican Income Distribution 
Pre-Tax  Tax  burden After-Tax Expenditure Imputed
Household Income  fraction of  Income   fraction of disposable
Income  Distribution 1/ Distribution 2/ Pre Tax distribution Distribution 3/ After-Tax  income
decile (%) (%) Income (%) (%) (%)    Income (%) distribution (%) 4/
A B C D E F G
Gini Coefficient 0.482 0.475 0.421
1 1.22 1.09 7.28 1.23 11.80 111.87 2.34
2 2.55 1.53 4.87 2.64 10.50 46.51 3.46
3 3.58 2.35 5.33 3.69 10.00 31.64 4.35
4 4.65 3.38 5.91 4.76 9.80 24.06 5.29
5 5.76 4.34 6.13 5.88 9.40 18.68 6.25
6 7.13 5.94 6.78 7.23 10.50 16.96 7.58
7 9.12 8.15 7.26 9.21 10.00 12.69 9.29
8 11.77 11.14 7.70 11.83 10.00 9.88 11.64
9 16.61 17.82 8.73 16.50 8.90 6.30 15.71
10 37.62 44.33 9.58 37.02 9.10 2.87 34.10
Source: ENIGH  (2008), System of National Accounts and  Minister of Finance's data.
1/ Adjusted household disposable income, published in National Accounts adjusted by taxes, pensions and net transfers. The paid taxes and the Social Security 
contribution are added w hereas Government transfers like welfare programs and subsidies (PROCAMPO, Oportunidades, etc) and pension payments (IMSS and
 ISSSTE)  are  substracted. The distribution is estimated based on distribution of current income in INEGI (2008).
2/ For VAT and excise taxes I estimate the burden distribution from consumption data. For the rest of the taxes I use estimates from Minister of Finance (2010).
3/ Minister of Finance (2010).
4/ Government net tranfers are taxes paid minus expenditure received.  
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Monetary Consumption  (A+B+C) on products taxed at:
Household General  Exempt  Zero VAT 
Income Rate (15%) Goods 1/ Total Food Medicine Other
decile A B C=C1+C2+C3 C1 C2 C3
Average 49.9% 23.6% 26.5% 24.4% 1.0% 1.1%
1 37.2% 16.5% 46.3% 44.3% 1.1% 0.9%
2 38.5% 20.2% 41.3% 39.1% 1.1% 1.1%
3 40.0% 22.3% 37.6% 35.4% 1.1% 1.1%
4 42.4% 21.9% 35.7% 33.6% 0.9% 1.2%
5 43.0% 23.3% 33.7% 31.6% 1.1% 1.1%
6 45.4% 22.9% 31.8% 29.9% 0.8% 1.1%
7 47.0% 23.4% 29.5% 27.5% 0.9% 1.1%
8 49.8% 24.0% 26.2% 24.2% 0.9% 1.0%
9 53.7% 24.1% 22.1% 20.3% 0.9% 1.0%
10 58.7% 25.6% 15.7% 13.5% 1.0% 1.3%
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares. 2008
1/ Includes transportation, education services, rent and medical services, books.

















Table A.4 Federal Taxes burden distribution 
Income  Income Social  Consumption  Gasoline Car Car
group Tax Security Excise Excise Tax Property Sales
Payroll tax Taxes Tax Tax
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
I -1.2 1.1 2.1 0.8 0.6 0.4
II -1.9 2.7 4.1 2.0 1.9 0.1
III -1.3 4.0 5.4 2.8 1.9 0.7
IV -0.4 5.4 7.5 4.3 3.3 0.5
V 0.6 6.7 8.7 5.9 5.2 1.4
VI 2.4 8.3 10.9 7.6 6.1 1.9
VII 5.9 10.5 12.8 9.4 8.2 3.9
VIII 11.0 13.3 12.0 13.7 10.2 9.8
IX 20.5 17.6 16.0 21.2 19.8 20.5
X 64.4 30.4 20.4 32.3 42.9 60.7
Source: Minister of Finance (2010)  
 